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"ACQUISITIONS" AND "GROUPS" UNDER SECTION I3(d)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
The beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms—
Socrates
The Williams Amendments of 1968 augmented the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 1 by requiring disclosure of persons or groups
seeking corporate control through the use of a cash tender offer? In
addition, subsection (d) was added to Section 13 of the Act. It pro-
vides, in part, that:
(1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly
the beneficial ownership of any equity security . . . is directly
or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than [ten] per
centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acqui-
sition . . . [file certain specified information.] 8
• • •
(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited
partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of
acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer,
such syndicate or group shall be deemed a "person" for the
purposes of this subsection'
The purpose of section 13(d) is to enable investors to make in-
1
 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1970).
2
 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(f) (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(f)
(1970).
8 Section 13(d) (1), 15 U.S.C.
	
78m(d) (1) (1970), requires that the following in-
formation be filed:
(A) the background and identity of all persons by whom or on whose behalf
the purchases have been or are to be effected;
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to
be used in making the purchases . . . ;
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire con-
trol of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals .. .
to make any ... major change in its business or corporate structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and
the number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly or
indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person, giving
the name and address of each such associate; and
(B) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understanding with
any person with respect to any securities of the issuer . .
In addition, all information which the Commission by its rules and regulations
prescribes as necessary for the protection of investors must be filed. The information to be
filed is embodied in Schedule 13 D, 17 C.F.R. * 240.13d-101 (1971).
4 IS US,C. § 78m(d) (Supp.` V, 1970), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
The 1970 Amendment changed the point at which disclosure is required from beneficial
ownership of 10 percent of an issuer's securities to 5 percent. However, since the cases
discussed in this comment arose when the 10 percent requirement was in effect, all
references in the article are to the ten percent requirement; otherwise, references are to
the statute as amended.
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telligent investment decisions by providing them with information con-
cerning shifts in corporate ownership which portend a change in
control." To achieve this objective the statute requires disclosure of
pertinent information upon the existence of two facts. The first is
the beneficial ownership of ten percent of the outstanding securities of
an issuer." More descriptively, a ten percent interest may be considered
a power base from which the policies of a corporation can be influenced
or controlled.' The second is a two percent or greater acquisition
of beneficial ownership in a . particular class of an issuer's equity secu-
rities within a twelve month period." Conceptually, a two percent
acquisition is an objective index of an intent to change management
or otherwise influence corporate policy."
The Courts applying these standards have reached conflicting
conclusions as to the meaning of "acquisition" in paragraph (1) of the
subsection and have also encountered difficulty in ascertaining the
scope of the paragraph (3) definition of "person." Acquisition has
been inconsistently defined as (1) a market purchase of securities,'"
5
 See pp. 163-66 infra.
0
 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 	 78m(d)(1)
(1970).
7 According to one authority:
The ten percent figure is commonly used as the size shareholding that gives
control of publicly held corporations. Although it may be too low for that
purpose, it seems much higher than the minimum size shareholding which
would give rise to an interest in structural decisions. At least in the publicly held
corporation, a figure of one percent would see more appropriate. . . .
Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate
Decision Making, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1969).
The ten percent figure was reduced to five percent by Pub. L. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497
(1970), amending the Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), codified as 15 U.S.C. H 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(1) (1970).
8
 "The purpose of § 13(d) is to require disclosure of information by persons who
have acquired a substantial interest, or increased their interest in the equity securities of
a company by a substantial amount, within a relatively short period of time." H.R. Rep.
No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reported in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2811, 2818 (1968)
(emphasis added).
A substantial increase is defined as two percent of the issuer's outstanding securities:
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to
(b) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a security which,
together with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the
same class during the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum
of that class.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (6)(B) (1970)..
9 The desire of Congress to separate acquisitions made for investment purposes from
those which require disclosure is evident in the statute. Section 13(d) (6)(D) provides that
the subsection shall not apply to "any acquisition . . . which the Commission . . . shall
exempt • as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the effect of, changing
or influencing the control of the issuer." 15 U.S.C. g 78m(d) (6)(D) (1970). See also
113 Cong. Rec. 24, 665 (1967) (exchange between Senators Javits and Williams).
10 GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062, 1070 (S.DN.Y. 1971); Ozark Airlines,
Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113, 1117-18 (E.D. Mo. 1971). See discussion at pp. 155-59
infra.
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(2) an acquisition of a beneficial interest in securities by any means,'
and (3) a purposeful acquisition of a:beneficial interest in securities."
The disparity lies not only in the meaning of the term acquisition, but
also in the specification of that which must be acquired--a beneficial
interest in the security vs. the security itself. The problem of defining
person has essentially been one of determining the characteristics of
a "group acting to acquire, hold or dispose of securities." The only
decision to consider carefully this question concluded that several
defendants constitute a group when, and only when, they act in concert
to acquire securities of an issuer." Thus, groups acting to hold or dis-
pose of securities were effectively eliminated from the paragraph (3)
definition."
This comment examines the legal foundation of the recent deci-
sions. Upon analysis, the legislative history of the Williams Amend-
ments and the statutory language of section 13 (d) suggest that
principles underlying the concept of "beneficial ownership," which
have evolved under Section 16 of the Exchange Act, define acquisition
and set the parameters of a paragraph (3) "group." The comment
concludes that (1) any acquisition of beneficial ownership is a re-
portable event under section 13(d) if the acquisition and resultant
interest in the issuer's securities are of sufficient magnitude; and (2)
individuals acting jointly to acquire, hold or dispose of securities con-
stitute a section 13 (d) (3) group if, by concerted action, the individ-
uals have acquired a beneficial interest in each other's securities.
I. "ACQUISITIONS" UNDER SECTION 13(d)
Determining the acquisitions which precipitate the section 13(d)
disclosure requirements presents two discrete problems. The first is
defining the term "acquisition." The difficulty is not so much a matter
of finding an acceptable meaning for the term as it is establishing
criteria by which to judge whether transactions fall within the ambit
of the subsection. The problem is similar to that arising under
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act." Section 16(b) provides that
profits realized by corporate "insiders" from purchases and sales of
an issuer's equity security made within a six month period shall
inure to the issuer." The problem lies in determining what trans-
11 Sisak v. Wings and Wheels Express, Inc., t1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec, L. Rep.	 92,991 at 90,668 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See discussion at pp. 159-61 infra,
12 Bath Indus., Inc v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 109 (7th Cir. 1970), discussed at pp. 153-55
infra.
13 Id.
14 The group purposes of acquiring, holding or disposing of securities are analogous
to purchasing, voting and selling securities. Since purchases of securities are not usually
necessary to groups acting to vote or sell securities, it is unlikely that these groups would
undertake any acquisition which might require ,them to register under § 13(d),
15 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
16 Id.
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actions constitute either a "purchase" or ta "sale." 17 Because certain
of the decisions to be discussed use the term purchase to define ac-
quisition, it may be helpful to note that a Purchase of securities is not
limited to the typical market transaction; a purchase has been broadly
described as any transaction which creates the potential for abuse
which the statute was designed to prevent."
The second problem presented is that of determining the meaning
of "beneficial ownership of securities" for the purposes of the subsec-
tion. The same problem arises under Section 16(a) of the Exchange
Act, which requires corporate insiders to report.changes in beneficial
ownership.'? While the interpretation given this section by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) clearly indicates that benefi-
cial ownership does not refer to ownership as of record, 2° the discern-
ible trend in the decisions interpreting section 13(d) is to equate the
two.' In order to understand the distinction between beneficial and
legal ownership, it may be helpful to view the latter as the bundle of
rights, privileges, powers and immunities, which ordinarily attaches to
legal title.22
 Beneficial ownership, on the other hand, refers to control
or enjoyment of the beneficial incidents of ownership by one who may
or may not possess legal title." The beneficial incidents which attach
to security ownership are those which are intrinsic to the security, such
as the rights to vote in corporate affairs and to collect interest or divi-
dends, and those which arise from dealing and speculating in the secu-
rity, such as the power to buy and sell the security."
1 T See Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954), for
discussion of these problems.
18 Newmark v. RKO General, Inc. 425 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.), cut. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970).
ao 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
20 11 Fed. Reg. 10967 (1934). 17 C.F.R. § 241.21 (1971). (Although 17 C.F.R. § 241
does not reprint the text of the interpretive releases, it is cited becauie it provides con-
yenient access to the text printed in the Federal Register and the CPI Fed. Sec. L. Rep.).
See text at pp. 157-59 infra.
22 See generally W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923).
23 31 Fed. Reg. 1375, 1376 (1966), 17 C.F.R. § 241.7824 (1971), provides that "[a]
person . .. may be regarded as the beneficial owner of securities held in the name of another
person, if by reason of any contract, understanding, relationship, agreement or other ar?
rangement, he obtains therefrom benefits substantially equivalent to those of ownership."
While 17 § 241.7824 (1971) discusses beneficial ownership of securities under
Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, "it should be noted that generally
the same principles apply to disclosing beneficial ownership [throughout the law of
Securities Regulation]." Id.
24 This categorization of beneficial incidents was suggested in Feldman and Teberg,
Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1944, 17 W. Res.
L. Rev. 1054, 1059 (1966).
Tbe thesis of the Feldman-Teberg article is that:
[I]f section 16(a) is to achieve its goals, "beneficial ownership" must be con-
strued "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate • • • [its]
broad remedial purposes." [Therefore] it is the enjoyment of the benefits of
security ownership, rather than the rights to such benefits, which is the ap-
propriate standard for construing the term "beneficial ownership" as used in
fsz
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By tradition, a partner is considered the beneficial Owner of secu-
rities held by the partnership in proportion to his interest in the part-
nership;" a husband is considered the beneficial owner of securities
held by his wife and minor children;" and a person who has the au-
thority to vote securities owned by another is considered the beneficial
owner of these securities.27 The recurring question in litigation arising
Under section 13 (d) is whether a group, by virtue of its concerted
action to acquire, hold or dispose of securities, acquires a beneficial
interest in the securities owned by its members and, if so, whether such
acquisition is a reportable event under section 13(d)2"
While the foregoing discussion should give the reader a basis for
understanding the ensuing analysis of decisions interpreting the sub-
section, none of the courts has distinguished the problem of defining
acquisition from that of defining beneficial ownership." Nor, in reach-
ing their decisions, have the courts examined the existing law, devel-
oped under section 16, which is relevant to the problems arising under
section 13." However, it is submitted that the present conflict of opin-
ion will eventually be resolved by reference to this law and, therefore,
the dichotomy of issues should be kept in mind.
A. Judicial Definitions
The case of Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot" presented the first
judicial opportunity to define the meaning of acquisition as used in
section 13(d)." The definition implicit in Bath was that acquisition
means a purposeful acquiSition of a beneficial interest in the securities
section 16(a). Accordingly, in computing whether a person is subject to the
section as the beneficial owner of more than ten percent of a dais of registered
equity security, the purposes of section 16(a) require the inclusion of any
securities from which he obtains those benefits of ownership which enable him
to achieve an inside poktion. And . . . once a person is subject to it, either by
reason of beneficial ownership or position as officer or director, he should also
be regarded as beneficially owning any securities from which he obtains benefits
of ownership which may provide either the incentive for, or lend themselves
to any of the abuses of inside position that the Exchange ACt was designed to
prevent.
Id. at 1065-66 (footnotes omitted). The author subscribes to this thesis and acknowledges
his reliance upon the article's excellent analysis of beneficial ownership under § 16.
20 11 Fed. Reg. 10970 (1938). 17 C.F.R. § 241.1965 (1971).
28 31 Fed. Reg. 1005 (1966). 17 C.F.R. § 241.7793 (1971).
27 Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 112 (7th Cir, 1970).
ss Every case in which the issue of determining the scope of * 13(d) (1) has arisen
has involved "group" action. See text at pp. 153-61 infra.
so Id.
so Id.
01 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
82 SectiOn 13(d) had been considered previously by courts but the bine raised con-
cerned the adequacy rather than the necessity of disclosure. See Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan
Am. Sulfur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970). See alio Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), which discussed the adequacy
of a Schedule 13D filed pursuant to §I 14(d)-(f) of the Williams Amendments. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78n(d)-(f) (1970).
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of an issuer.83
 The case involved a group of 'stockholders cooperating
in an effort to change Bath's management. The controversy originated
when the defendant Blot, a director of the corporation, proposed a
change of the chief executive officer to the board of directors. The
proposal was rejected, whereupon Blot set out to enlist the support of
several substantial shareholders in an effort to effect the change. Ap-
proximately one year later, Blot again submitted the proposal, this
time with an accompanying list of his alleged supporters. He intimated
that unless the proposal were adopted, a special stockholders' meeting
would be called, the number of directors increased, and the change
thereby effected. Although neither Blot nor any of his supporters
owned ten - percent of Bath's securities, collectively they either owned
or controlled approximately fifty percent of Bath's stock and, during
the year, had made purchases totalling substantially more than two
percent. The corporation responded to Blot's threat by filing suit and
requesting a preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from
taking any of the aforementioned actions, pending trial on the issue
of whether the defendants had violated section 13 (d).
In support of its request for the injunction, Bath contended that
section 13 (d) requires disclosure whenever stockholders who benefi-
cially own ten percent or more of a corporation's outstanding shares
agree to act in concert." The defendants, who admittedly had not
filed Schedule 13D, contended that the section governs purchases of
shares, by cash tender offer or otherwise, but that it is not directed
toward the concerted action of existing stockholders."
On appeal from a district court decree granting the injunction,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that compliance with
the disclosure provisions of section 13(d) is required when, and only
when, any group of stockholders benefically owning more than ten per-
cent of the securities of a corporation agrees to act in concert to ac-
quire additional shares." The court observed that, although the district
court had not examined the contents of the group's agreement, the
lower court had made a subsidiary finding that some members of the
group had purchased additional Bath securities. In view of this finding,
the court held that a rebuttable presumption was raised that the pur-
chases had been made pursuant to a group agreement dated the day of
the purchase. The court concluded that the defendants had acted as
a group to acquire securities as of that date; since the defendants
collectively owned over ten percent of Bath's securities, they were
required to have registered within ten days of their agreement. The
court therefore sustained the injunction.
The Seventh Circuit considered the primary issue to be whether
the defendants had acted as a group; the court failed to confront di-
88 See text at notes 37-41 infra.
84 427 F.2d at 108-09..
85
 Id. at 109.
88 Id.
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rectly the problem of defining "acquisition." 87 Yet, a decision requiring
the defendants to register pursuant to section 13 (d) presupposes the
occurrence of the necessary acquisition by the group.88 The implicit
premise was that if several defendants aggregately owning ten percent
or more of an issuer's securities act as a group, the group acquires a
beneficial interest in the securities of its constituents by virtue of the
concerted action. Importantly, the court expressly denied that an ac-
quisition of securities—as opposed to an acquisition of beneficial in-
terest in securities—was a prerequisite to the disclosure requirements:
"Once the group agrees to act in concert to acquire shares, its members
must comply with the Act's disclosure requirements whether or not any
one of them has at that time acquired stock in furtherance of the un-
derlying plan."39
While Bath seems to be precedent for an expansive definition of
acquisition, the decision does not actually define the term, nor do the
facts of the case require the broadest interpretation. The acquisition by
the group resulted from a concerted effort to obtain control.° Thus,
acquisition may be defined restrictively to mean "that which is ob-
tained purposefully through the efforts of the acquirer." This meaning
would effectively eliminate from the scope of the statute acquisitions
by operation of law, such as by inheritance or gift:"
Since the defendants in Bath had in fact acquired over two per-
cent of Bath's securities by purchase, prior to court determination that
registration was required, it is not surprising that Bath was later dis-
tinguished on its facts. In GAF Corporation v. Milstein," the court,
in a carefully reasoned opinion, did distinguish Bath, holding that
acquisition means a market purchase of securities 4 3 The Milstein de-
fendants were related stockholders of GAF Corporation. Collectively
they owned approximately 10.25 percent of GAF's convertible pre-
ferred stock, which they had acquired as a result of GAF's merger
87 Id. at 108. The court stated that:
Since it is conceded that no individual defendant owns 10% of the outstanding
stock of Bath and since the disclosure provisions of the Williams Act come into
play only when a person or group beneficially owns more than 10% of the relevant
class of a corporation's shares, we must first determine whether... the defendants
should be treated as a "group" within the meaning of the Act.
Concluding that the defendants were a "group," the court held that "full disclosure for
the benefit and protection of other stockholders and investors will be required." Id. at
110-11.
88 Section 13(d) requires registration by "lainy person who, after acquiring . . .
the beneficial ownership of any equity security . . . is the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum ...." 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
zg 427 F.2d at 110.
40 Not only is group effort to take control necessary, the group must agree to acquire
additional shares to reinforce its position against management before registration is
required. Id. at 109-10.
41 See for example, Ozark Airlines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113, 1117-18
(E.D.Mo. 1971) discussed at p. 159 infra.
42 324 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
43 Id. at 1068, 1070.
155
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND - COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
with the Ruberoid Company. Prior to the merger, the Milsteins had
owned about eight percent of Ruberoid's common stock; GAF owned
twenty-six percent. During the merger, GAF's- holdings in Ruberoid
were cancelled, causing the defendant's interest automatically to in-
crease from eight percent in Ruberoid to 10.25 percent in GAF's con-
vertible preferred. In addition to the preferred shares thus acquired,
the Milsteins had purchased 1.6 percent of GAF's common stock.
GAF alleged that the Milsteins had conspired to take over the
corporation and that they were thus required by section 13 to file
Schedule 13D." GAF's theory was that when stockholders owning ten
percent of a corporation's securities act to obtain control, under para-
graph (3) the individual stock ownership is constructively conveyed
to the group thus formed. Since the group owned over ten percent of
GAF's securities, and had acquired over two percent through construc-
tive conveyance, registration was required. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Pollack, J.) sustained the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The court held that the mere organization of a group
of stockholders owning more than ten percent of a class of equity
security, with the intention of seeking control is, without more, not a
reportable event under the subsection." The court noted that a group
can avoid filing under section 13(d) (1) if it does not acquire a signifi-
cant number of securities after its formation."
Unlike the Bath decision, GAF did not closely consider whether
the defendants comprised a "group." Rather, the court apparently as-
sumed that they did and moved directly to the problem of defining
"acquisition." After noting that the statute contains no definition of
this term, the court concluded that the statutory language clearly com-
pelled "the construction that the reportable event is the acquisition of
the requisite amount of shares and not the mere formation of a group.
. . ."47
 The court distinguished Bath on its facts noting that, in that
44 Id. at 1064, 1066.
45 Id. at 1068-70.
46
 Id. at 1071.
47 Id. at 1067. The court's rationale in reaching this conclusion was that the statute
on its face did not require disclosure in respect to an individual, absent an acquisition of
securities. To require a group of individuals to file where no securities had been acquired
would result in disparate treatment of individuals and groups. While granting that certain
statutes make group action "more reprehensible" than individual action, e.g., monopolies
under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970), the court stated that the number of
people involved is unimportant in the context of corporate takeovers. "It is money not
numbers that counts here." Id. at 1068.
The problem with this analysis is that the court incorrectly assumed that no dis-
closure is required of individuals who have not purchased securities. The statute states
that any person, whether an individual or a group, must register after acquiring a
beneficial interest in securities. 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)(1) (1970). Thus, if an individual
acquires a 10 percent beneficial interest by acquiring a vested beneficial interest in a
trust, he should be required to register. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8 (1971); Sisak v. Wings
& Wheels Express, Inc. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 92,991
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Cf. Ozark Airlines, Inc. v. Cox; 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D.Mo. 1971).
Obviously, there is no disparity in requiring a group also to register, absent a purchase of
securities, if it has acquired the requisite beneficial interest through group action.
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case, the defendants had purchased over two percent of Bath's secur-
ities, whereas the Milstein family had purchased only 1.6 percent of
GAF's stock."
The salient aspect of the GAF definition of acquisition is the re-
quirement that a corporation's equity securities, not merely a beneficial
interest in those securities, must be acquired. This requirement effec-
tively eliminates groups which act to hold or dispose of securities from
section 13 (d) registration requirements. Since these groups are either
voting or selling securities, further acquisitions may not be essential
to the group purpose. In most cases, the possibility of being subjected
to disclosure requirements of the subsection will suffice to deter pur-
chases which might bring the group within the court's definition of a
reportable event.
Perhaps the same criticism could be directed toward the Bath
decision, which limited paragraph (3) groups to those acting to acquire
securities." However, the court in Bath presumably would consider
any coalition of stockholders a group if any of the individuals made a
purchase, no matter how small.' Thus, even a minimal purchase would
transform the group purpose from one of holding or disposing to acquir-
ing, thus bringing the group within the paragraph (3) definition. To the
extent that the GAF decision requires a purchase of at least two per-
cent, it represents a more severe limitation of the scope of section 13
(d), as applied to concerted stockholder action.
A more important difference between the two decisions is that the
Bath court imposed the "purchase" requirement on the definition of
"person" in paragraph (3) 51 while the GAF court read the require-
ment into the definition of "acquisition" in paragraph (1). The result
under Bath is that any person, whether an individual or a group, is
required to register if the specified amount of beneficial interest has
been acquired; under GAF neither groups nor individuals need make
disclosure under section 13 (d), regardless of the beneficial interest
acquired, if no securities have been purchased. For example, a person
who acquires the right to vote securities owned by another, such as by
48 324 F. Supp. at 1071. The court also noted that the securities purchased were
common stock and therefore not in the class of convertible preferred, of which the
defendants held 10 percent. However, this fact would not be determinative. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d.3 (1971), providing that a person shall be deemed the beneficial owner
of securities of a class which he has a right to acquire through presently convertible
securities. The important question is whether, upon conversion, the defendants would
have owned 10 percent of the common stock. Apparently they would not. 324 F. Supp.
at 1064.
40 427 F.2d at 109.
50 Id. at 110. After holding that a group agreeing to acquire additional shares was
required to register, the court concluded that "once it is shown that . . . a group has
agreed to pursue a common objective, and once it is further shown that a member of
the group has thereafter purchased additional shares of the corporation's stock, then a
rebuttable presumption arises that such purchase was made pursuant to an agreement of
the group ... [and compliance] with the Act's disclosure provisions . . . [is] required
within ten days of such purchase." Id.
51 Id. at 109.
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irrevocable proxy, would be required to register under Bath, but ac-
cording to the GAF court, he would not." However, as pointed out in
Bath: "[I]n the context of struggles for corporate control . . . voting
control of stock is the only relevant element of ... ownership . . . .""
Thus, the GAF decision eliminates many acquisitions particularly sig-
nificant to the purposes of the subsection.
Another interesting aspect of the GAF decision is its narrow de-
finition of acquisition. Although the court speaks alternately in terms
of "acquisitions of shares" and "purchases of shares," it appears to
limit the application of section 13 (d) to market purchases of securi-
ties. Responding to the plaintiff's argument that securities owned by
individuals are constructively conveyed to the group when it acts to
obtain corporate control, the court stated:
[A] constructive "conveyance" from individuals to the group,
by aggregating the holdings of a group, by itself does not
affect the equilibrium between supply and demand and there-
fore cannot affect market values. The basic protection of Sec-
tion 13(d) is to indicate who is behind large holdings that
are created or supplemented by market trading . . . and
showing the cause of various price movements is not needed
when there have been neither open market purchases nor any
tender offer. Requiring a group to file in such a situation, as
plaintiff argues ... is superfluous in the context the Williams
Bill's goals if not counter to them altogether."
However, to the extent that the formation of a group represents
a new coalition of voting power which may signify a change in corpo-
rate policy or management, the supply and demand equilibrium will
predictably be affected if this information is disclosed. The trading
behavior which the Williams Amendments are designed to affect is
that of investors at large who, without disclosure, would rely on in-
accurate information regarding the issuer." On the other hand, infor-
mation concerning purchases by a group are superfluous to the
objectives of the Amendments except to the degree that a new con-
52 See id. at 112 where the Bath court held that since an investment adviser who
recommended a stock purchase is usually allowed to vote the stock, the adviser is
considered the beneficial owner of the stock.
55 Id.
54 324 F. Supp. at 1070.
55
 The need for disclosure to protect investors when changes in corporate control
occur was summarized by former SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen:
A change in control brings with it the possibility of different operating results
and different investment results . . . [A change] may be either good or bad
depending upon the facts and circumstances involved. But investors and their
advisors cannot reach informed conclusions on the possible effects of a change
in control until the facts are available to them.
Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 133-34 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
S. 5101.
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solidation of voting strength has occurred. Since acquisitions are not
reportable until after they have been made, it is unlikely that Congress
intended the disclosed information to affect any market transactions
which may be executed by the group." The court's elimination of non-
market acquisitions from the scope of the subsection thus seems in-
compatible with the objectives of the Amendments.
Despite the inordinately narrow reading of section 13 (d) by the
court in GAF, the decision appears destined to be influential. In Ozark
Airlines, Inc. v. Cox," the court followed the GAF interpretation of the
subsection, holding that an inheritance of more than ten percent of an
issuer's securities by a beneficiary of a trust and the legatee under the
residuary clause of a will is not an aquisition which requires registra-
tion under section 13(d)." "[The] subsection . . . clearly is designed
to regulate filings regarding purposeful acquisitions, holdings, or dis-
posals . . . . Indeed, information to be furnished in a 13(d) filing ex-
pressly relates to purchases .... 78° The court also held that, although
certain of the defendants comprised a group within the meaning of
paragraph (3), and owned more than ten percent of a class of the
issuer's securities, no registration was required because the defendants
had not made purchases exceeding two percent.°
A final permutation on the problem of interpreting section 13(d)
was stated in Sisak v. Wings and Wheels Express, Inc. 6' The District
Court for the Sourthern District of New York (Frankel, J.) held that
the acquisition of a ten percent beneficial interest in an issuer's securi-
ties, by any means, was sufficient to activate the disclosure require-
ments of section 13(d). 62 In Wings and Wheels, Edward L. Richter,
founder and principal stockholder of Wings, died leaving an estate
including over thirty percent of Wings' stock to his widow as principal
beneficiary. Eight months later, in July 1969, the estate contracted to
sell its Wings stock to Novo Corporation (Novo). Shortly thereafter,
Novo proposed a merger with Wings; the offer was rejected. During
the following year, Novo actively pursued its desire to merge through
various involved maneuverings which included (1) entering into agree-
ments to purchase approximately twenty percent of Wings stock in
addition to that held by the Richter estate; and (2) an agreement
with Weisner, president of Wings, in which Wings was to acquire
Novo Air Freight, a subsidiary of Novo, for a negotiable amount of
Wings stock.
Plaintiff Sisak was a stockholder and insurance broker of Wings.
50
 15 U.S.C.'§ 78m(d)(I) (1970).
57
 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D.Mo. 1971).
58 Id. at 1117-18. The court expressly recognized that the Cox Medical Center had
acquired a beneficial interest exceeding 10 percent of Ozark Airlines' securities but con-
cluded that this was insufficient to invoke the disclosure requirements of § 13(d). Id.
50 Id. (emphasis in original).
60 Id. at 1118.
51 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 92,991 (1970).
82 Id. at 90,668.
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Disapproving of the merger, he formed a voting trust to prevent it
and also filed individual, derivative, and class actions, the latter on
behalf of all stockholders, alleging violations of the Securities Act of
1933," and the Sherman" and Clayton Acts." In addition, he moved
for a preliminary injunction to enjoin all corporate action in further-
ance of the merger, alleging a violation of section 13(d). Sisak con-
tended that when the stock had passed to the estate upon Richter's
death, the estate, the executor and the beneficiary were all required
to file Schedule 13D as beneficial owners of more than ten percent of a
class of Wings' securities. Sisak also contended that the defendants
had acted as a group for the purpose of (1) transferring securities
owned by Wings to Novo and (2) acquiring for Novo the Wings
securities from the estate, Wings and two large stockholders.
The court held that an acquisition of ten percent of a class of an
issuer's securities, whether by operation of law or by purchase, must
be disclosed:
[Section 13 (d)] with no pertinent qualification, requires
"[a]ny person . . . acquiring" registered securities and be-
coming by such acquisition [the] beneficial owner of more
than 10% of the relevant class of securities to file the pre-
scribed information . . . . The statute is not limited to any
particular mode of "acquisition," nor has the SEC so limited
its operation by any regulation."
The court, however, rejected the argument that the defendants had
acted as a group, stating that, in this context, the concept of group
action does not encompass both the buyer and seller of securities ° 7
Thus the court granted the injunction against the estate, its executor
and its beneficiary but dismissed the motion as to the other defendants.
The Wings and Wheels decision is the broadest possible interpre-
tation of section 13 (d). Under the definition provided, one may acquire
the requisite interest notwithstanding the absence of aggressive action
on the part of the recipient. Furthermore, the acquisition of merely a
beneficial interest is considered sufficient to activate the disclosure
requirements. This result follows from noting that the injunction is-
sued against the executor and beneficiary of the estate, both of whom
were only beneficial owners of ten percent of Wings' securities." It
63
 15	 $§ 77a et seq. (1970).
04 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
as 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq. (1970).
66 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. SeC. L. Rep. at 90,668.
07 Id, at 90,670. However, the court did not discount the possibility that a group
with identical aims may be appropriately characterized as a group acting to acquire and
dispose of securities or to acquire, hold and dispose of securities. "If the purchase and
sale were incident to a general plan to hold securities, a different result might obtain."
Id. According to the court, the identity of objectives is a critical factor in determining
who would appropriately comprise . the group.. Id.
63 Id. at 90,668. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-4 (a) (1) (1971), exempting executors
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would be anticipated then, that had the court found certain of the de-
fendants to be acting as a group, it would have held that the group
had acquired the necessary beneficial , interest requiring registration."
Thus, with a touch of irony, the Wings and Wheels decision ap-
pears to be the perfect complement to the disparate judicial interpre-
tations of section 13 (d). Under the Wings and Wheels and GAF
decisions (both from the S.D.N.Y.), acquisition has been interpreted
to be antonymous with itself: Wings and Wheels holding that a non-
purposeful acquisition of beneficial interest will satisfy the statutory
requirements;" GAF holding that a market purchase of securities is
required.' While the existing conflict of views is certain to have a
disquieting effect upon persons in situations similar to those of the
defendants in the above cases, failure of the courts to provide a
theoretical foundation to resolve the issue is even more disturbing.
None of the decisions discussed sets forth a tenable rationale for its
interpretation of section 13 (d).
While the court in Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot did not directly
consider the problem of defining acquisition, it assumed that if the
defendants were, by reason of their group effort, a "person" as defined
by paragraph (3), then the entity acquired a beneficial interest in its
members' securities for the purpose of the subsection." While the
assumption may be true, it extends the traditional interpretations of
beneficial ownership and requires explanation." Furthermore, Bath
discerned a congressional intent to limit application of the statute to
situations involving acquisitions of securities and used this interpre-
tation to define "group action."74 Assuming that this reading of the
legislative history is correct, the restriction should be equally applica-
ble to situations involving a single defendant. However, achieving such
equal application necessitates reading the purchase requirement into
and administrators of an estate of a decedent from § 16(a)-(b) of the Exchange Act
during the 12 month period following their appointment.
69 This analysis presumes that the court would agree with the holding in Bath that
a group acquires a beneficial interest in the securities owned by its members. 427 F.2d at
109.
The court in Sistak did not address itself to the question of whether the two large
shareholders, owning together more than 10 percent of Wings stock, comprised .a group
acting to dispose of Wings securities when they agreed to sell their holdings to Novo
Corporation at a substantial premium. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. at 90,668. Groups acting to dispose of securities are discussed at pp. 172-73 infra.
7° [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 90, 668.
71 324 F. Supp. at 1068, 1070.
72 427 F.2d at 109.
78 For example, a partnership is not usually considered the beneficial owner of the
securities held by its members. 11 Fed. Reg. 10970 (1938). 17 C.F.R. § 241.1965 (1971).
See the discussion at p. 168 infra.
74 427 F,2d at 109. "Our review of the . . . purpose of Congress in enacting this
legislation was to protect the individual investor when substantial shareholders or man-
agement undertake to acquire shares in a corporation for the purpose of solidifying their
own position in a [control] contest . . ." Id.
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the definition of acquisition in paragraph (1) of the subsection." If
this were done, the result would alter the court's implied definition
from "an acquisition of beneficial ownership" to "a purchase of se-
curities," contradicting both the holding of the case and the statutory
language.
In GAF, the only other carefully reasoned decision, the court
based its interpretation primarily on the statutory language." A com-
parison of the statute and the court's rationale is worth noting. The
statute provides that registration is required "after acquiring directly
or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security . . 
.""
The GAF interpretation requires registration "after acquiring . . .
ownership of any equity security .... 778
 Since substantially different
results follow from an interpretation requiring the acquisition of secur-
ities rather than the acquisition of beneficial ownership," the omission
in GAF severely undercuts the validity of the court's reasoning.
The absence of a persuasive rationale supporting a particular
interpretation of the statute is probably the best explanation for the
wide divergence of opinion. More difficult to explain is the failure of
the courts to look to the decisions interpreting Section 16 of the Ex-
change Act for guiding principles.80
 The similarity between the inter-
pretive problems of section 13(d) and section 16(a) and (b) has
already been pointed out." This similarity and the almost identical
statutory phrasing of these sections would seem to demand that an a
priori inquiry into the correct interpretation of section 13 (d) begin
with the principles and law developed under section 16. 82
 That none
of the above discussed cases used this approach is probably due to the
fact that, in the early cases applying section 13(d), the courts were
confronted with the primary issue of whether stockholders cooperating
in an effort to obtain corporate control were required to register."
75
 Section 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970), the general disclosure require-
ment, applies to all persons, individuals or groups. The Bath court, however, used its
interpretation of the legislative history to construe the § 13(d) (3) ; definition of "person";
this definition applies only to the joint action of two or more persons. 427 F.2d at 109.
78 324 F. Supp. at 1067.
77
 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
78
 324 F. Supp. at 1066.
78
 See pp. 157-58 supra.
80 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1970).
81 See pp. 151-52 supra.
82 Section 13(d) (1) provides: "Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly
the beneficial ownership of more than 5 per centum of such class...." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(1) (1970). Section 16(a) provides: "Every person who is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of equity security. . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
88
 All the cases previously discussed involved "group" action. See pp. 153-61 supra.
Other cases interpreting the Williams Amendments involved purchases of securities which
unquestionably were within the scope of the Amendment. Thus the definition of "acquisi-
tion" was not at issue. See Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulfur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th
Cir. 1970); Electronics Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969).
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For different reasons, the courts in Bath and GAF, which set the
tone of the decisions in this area of law, felt that mere cooperative
efforts to obtain control, without more, need not be disclosed. To this
end, the Bath court read into the paragraph (3) definition of "person"
a requirement that a group must act to purchase securities, and the
GAF court defined "acquisition of beneficial ownership" as a pur-
chase of securities. While one might agree that some cooperative efforts
of stockholders should be excluded from the statute, it is submitted
that Bath's interpretation of the congressional intent is not supported
by the legislative history of the subsection, and that GAF's reading of
the statute contradicts the statutory language which should be inter-
preted in accordance with the law developed under Section 16 of the
Exchange Act.
13. The Legislative History
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the legislative history of
the Williams Amendments, insofar as it relates to section 13 (d), is the
paucity of literature concerning either the scope or the implications of
the subsection. The discussion in the hearings and in the Congressional
Record focuses upon the regulation of the cash tender offer and con-
tains what may be described as incidental remarks concerning section
13 (d) :
S. 510 . . . amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
requiring the disclosure of pertinent information ... (1) when
a person or group of persons seek to acquire a substantial
block of equity securities of a corporation by a cash tender
offer . or through open market or privately negotiated pur-
chases, or (2) when a corporation repurchases its own equity
securities."
While this language and the primary objective of Congress to regulate
purchases by cash tender offer tend to support the argument that the
Amendment is limited to purchases of securities, the House Report, in
the section-by-section summary, indicates that a broader interpreta-
tion is warranted:
[Paragraph (3) of subsection (d)] would prevent a group of
persons who seek to pool their voting or other interests .. .
from evading the provisions of the statute because no one in-
dividual owns more than 10 percent of the securities. The
group would be deemed to have become the beneficial owner
. . . of more than 10 percent of a class of securities at the
time they agreed to act in concert. Consequently, the group
would be required to file the information called for in section
84 H. R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reported in U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2811 (1968) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as H. R. Rep.]. To the same
effect see 113 Cong. Rec. 24,664 (1967) and Hearings on S. 510, supra note 55, at 133-34.
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13 (d) (1) within 10 days after they agreed to act together,
whether or not any member of the group had acquired any
securities at that time."
Unfortunately, this description seems to be inconsistent with other
statements in the Report and is not supported by anything in the
previously mentioned discussions. Professor Louis Loss has remarked
in connection with another of the Amendments that the Report "bears
the earmarks of a bit of manufactured legislative history."" Presum-
ably, this remark, if it is also applicable to the summary of subsection
13 (d)—and it is submitted that it is—does not mean that the summary
is incorrect but rather that it cannot be taken at face value. Thus, the
legislative history is ambiguous, at best, and inconsistent, at worst,
and its relevance to the statute must be gleaned inferentially.
Senate Bill 2731, the predecessor of S. 510, which was later enacted
into law as the Williams Amendments, was the congressional response
to pleas from the management sector for protection from so-called
"corporate raiders!" 87 Allegedly, these outsiders were effectively using
the cash tender offer to acquire corporate control, liquidate assets and
thereby realize a quick profit." The basic thrust of the bill was to
require disclosure prior to the making of the cash tender offer so that
management could marshal its defenses to thwart the takeover bid."
Because the tender offer was often preceded by, and in some cases
dependent upon, substantial acquisitions of securities through open
market or privately negotiated purchases, disclosure of these acquisi-
tions was also required." This provision, the direct antecedent of
section 13 (d), was an integral part of the legislative scheme to regulate
cash tender offers and it served as an additional warning to manage-
ment of potential threats." That the provision was framed as an
amendment to Section 10 of the Exchange Act" and required preac-
quisition disclosure" indicates that Congress may have intended that
85 H. R. Rep., supra note 84, at 2818.
88 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3661 (Supp. 1969), commenting on 14(e) of
the Williams Amendments, 15 U.S.C. 78n(e) (1970).
a/ 111 Cong. Rec. 28,257 (1965).
88 "In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells
after white-collar pirates have seized control with funds from sources . . . unknown in
many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up the loot among
themselves." Id. (remarks of Senator Williams).
89 Id. at 28,259.
90 Id.
al Id.
92 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1970) prohibits the use of any manipulative or deceptive de-
vice or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
98 in Cong. Rec. 28,259 (1965). Disclosure was required twenty days prior to the
acquisition. The preacquisition disclosure requirement of S. 2731 seems clearly incom-
patible with the argument that a "group" acquires a beneficial interest when its members
agree to act in concert. Where mere concurrence is the event requiring registration,
there is nothing to report before the agreement, but when an agreement is made, registra-
tion is already twenty days late.
164
"ACQUISITIONS" AND "GROUPS" UNDER THE 1934 ACT,
it should serve to equalize the relative bargaining positions of buyers
and sellers in prospective market transactions and to reduce the pos-
sibility of fraud. Thus, the over-all design of Congress at this point in
the legislative history would seem to be compatible with the interpreta-
tion that the scope of what was to become section 13 (d) was limited
to situations in which purchases of securities were contemplated.
However, S. 2731 died in committee. When it was reintroduced as
S. 510, the provisions relating to more general acquisitions of beneficial
ownership were severed from those pertaining to cash tender offers
and were offered, as an amendment to section 13; in addition, disclosure
was not to be required until after the acquisitions had been made.'
While these changes were probably formulated to avoid favoring either
management or stockholders in a struggle for control," it is clear that
section 13 (d) no longer has a role to play in the specific purchases
contemplated by persons required to register under the subsection.
More importantly, the underlying purpose of the Amendment was
changed from protection of management to disclosure of shifts in
ownership indicating a possible change in control.°° The evil to be.
eliminated was not the covert purchases by an individual or a group, but
rather, the undesirability of permitting a situation in which investors
make investment decisions without adequate information." Whether
a position of power is obtained through a purchase of securities or
through a coalition of existing stockholders should be immaterial to
the goals of the statute if the implied result is a shift in control.
This reading of the legislative history is clearly incompatible
with the idea that a purchase of securities is a prerequisite to dis-
closure. Group efforts to vote or sell securities may have a significant
effect upon corporate policy and are therefore important to investors."
However, by requiring a purchase of securities prior to disclosure,
these groups have been exempted froth the disclosure requirement and
the effectiveness of the Amendment has thus been limited. Similarly,
individual acquisitions of a ten percent beneficial interest in an issuer's
securities by gift or devise under a will would escape disclosure."
However, since the Amendment is designed to require disclosure only
of those acquisitions entered into for the purpose of, or having the
effect of, changing or influencing control, this result might initially
04
 113 Cong. Rec. 856 (1967).
DO Id. at 854. "[E]xtreme care [was taken] 	 . to balance the scales equally to pro-
tect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders without
unduly impeding cash takeover bids. Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the
balance of regulatory burden in favor of management or ... the offeror. Id. (remarks of
Senator Williams).
.uo Id. at 855.
07 Id.
98 See pp. 171-73 infra.
99 See e.g., Ozark Airlines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.Mo. 1971) discussed
at p. 159 supra.
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appear to be compatible with the aims of the statute."° Nevertheless,
such an acquisition may very well influence the control of a corpora-
tion."' The only accurate statement that can be made in this situation
is that, while the acquisition does not manifest an intent to obtain or
influence control, it harbors the possibility of significant influence by
one whose propensities are not yet reflected in corporate policy through
past voting activities. If this type of acquisition is to be exempt from
the disclosure requirement, the exemption should be made upon due
consideration by the Securities and Exchange Commission and not by
the courts. 102 Furthermore, definition of "acquisition of beneficial inter-
est" as a purchase of securities would not require disclosure by an
individual acquiring irrevocable proxies. This too seems clearly incon-
sistent with the overall objectives of the Act.
Ultimately, any interpretation of section 13 (d) which relies
totally upon the legislative history will be unpersuasive, for there is
no indication that this Amendment received congressional scrutiny.
However, the statutory language seems to indicate clearly that Con-
gress did not intend to limit the applicability of the subsection to
situations involving only purchases of securities.
C. The Statutory Language
Section 13 (d) is phrased in terms of the acquisition, direct or in-
direct, of beneficial ownership in securities. As traditionally understood
in the law of securities regulation, a beneficial owner is one who by rea-
son of any contract, understanding, relationship, agreement or other ar-
rangement possesses benefits substantially equivalent to those of
ownership.103 The Securities and Exchange Commission has applied this
"benefits test" to the family context.'" It has been persuasively argued
that this test is also applicable to any situation in which a person
enjoys the benefits of ownership pertinent to the disclosure provisions
of the Exchange Act."' More importantly, there is significant evidence
100 15 U.S.C.§ 78rn(d) (6) (1970) provides that:
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to-
...
(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security which the Commission,
by rules or regulation or by order, shall exempt from the provisions of this sub-
section as not entered into for the purpose of and not having the effect of,
changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended
within the purposes of this section.
101 It seems highly unlikely that a person acquiring a "controlling" interest in a
company by inheritance or other nonpurposeful acquisition would not at some time
take steps influencing the management of a company even if he, at the time of acquisition,
had no intent to do so. See e.g., Ozark Airlines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo.
1971) ; Sisak v. Wings & Wheels Express, Inc. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 11 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
102 See note 100 supra.
104 d3 
Id.
. Fed. Reg. 1005 (1966). 17 C.F.R. 241.7793 (1971).
104 
105 Feldman and Teberg, Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16 of the Securities
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that the paragraph (3) definition of "person" is a legislative formula-
tion of the benefits test, to be applied in determining who must register
under section 13(d).
The section-by-section summary of the House Report on the
Williams Amendments provides that:
The paragraph (3) subsection (d) definition of "person"'
would prevent a group of persons who seek to pool their
voting or other interests in the securities of an issuer from
evading the provisions of the statute because no one individ-
ual owns more than 10 percent of the securities. The group
would be deemed to have become the beneficial owner,
directly or indirectly, of more than 10 percent of a class of
securities at the time they agree to act in concert . . . . This
provision is designed to obtain full disclosure of the identity
of any person or group obtaining the benefits of ownership
of securities by reason of any contract, understanding, rela-
tionship, agreement or other arrangement.'"
Clearly, if the above language were taken at face value, the con-
flict in the decisions which now exists would not have developed. But
at least one court has taken the position, at the instance of Professor
Loss, that the legislative reports "do not appropriately reflect the law
as enacted."'" However, while the reports are at times ambiguous, it
is submitted that the above excerpt from the reports is the correct
interpretation of paragraph (3) because it is the only cogent explana-
tion for including the paragraph in the Amendments.
During the period in which the Williams Amendments were
under consideration, former SEC Chairman Cohen suggested, inter
alia, that the paragraph (3) definition be deleted since, in his opinion,
it was within the definition of section,3 (a) (9), the general definition
of "person" in the 1934 Act." While most of his suggestions were
accepted, this one was not. The retention of the amendment necessarily
implies that it serves a function. If the sole function of the paragraph
were to expand the existing definition of person, it is likely that Con-
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 1054 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Feldman and
Teberg].
100 H. R. Rep. supra note 84, at 2818 (emphasis added).
107 GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Apparently
Professor Loss' original position was in accord with the House Report quoted:
So far as both new filing provisions—H 13(d) and 14(d)—are concerned, . •
[a]ny	 . group [acting to acquire, hold or dispose of an issuer's securities] is
considered to become the beneficial owner of more than 10 percent at the time its
members agree to act in concert. Consequently, the group must file . . • within
ten days after its members agree to act together, whether or not any member has
acquired any security at that time.
6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3664 (Supp. 1969).
108 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (9) (1970), defines "person" as an "individual, a corporation,
a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, ti business trust, or an unincorporated
organization." Specifically, Chairman Cohen thought that "syndicate or other group," as
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gress would have left this task to the SEC. A more substantial justifica-
tion for its retention is that it is the practice of the 'SEC to treat
beneficial ownership of section 3 (a) (9) entities separately."' For
example, a partnership under the section 3 (a) (9) definition does not
ordinarily acquire a beneficial interest in the securities owned by the
individual partners."° Therefore, under this definition, a group of
individuals acting as a partnership could acquire a controlling interest
in a corporation without making disclosure if each partner owned less
than ten percent of the corporation's securities. This is exactly the
result which Congress intended to avoid by enacting section 13 (d) (3).
The expressed purpose of paragraph (3) is to require disclosure in
this and similar situations where individuals seek to circumvent the
requirements of the subsection by pooling their interests.'"
It is therefore suggested that section 13 (d) (3) manifests a con-
gressional intent to apply principles of beneficial ownership developed
under section 16(a) of the Exchange Act to the problems arising under
section 13 (d). It is further suggested that Congress intended to extend
these principles to include those persons acting in concert to acquire,
hold or dispose of securities. The primary function of paragraph (3),
then, is to designate the type of agreement under which the group
formed will be considered to be the beneficial owner of the securities
held by its constituents; such an agreement gives rise to an acquisition
sufficient to trigger the disclosure requirement of the subsection.
It follows that the purchase definition of "acquisition" in
paragraph (1) should be discarded and that a fair reading of the
Amendment must give full meaning to the statutory language. It is
therefore submitted that an acquisition of beneficial ownership is a
reportable event. Since even a nonpurposeful acquisition, such as by
operation of law, may give rise to a change in corporate policy or
direction, any acquisition should be reported. If upon further considera-
tion the SEC should determine that a particular type of acquisition
does not have the effect of changing or influencing the control of an
issuer, it has the express power to exempt that transaction from the
filing requirements.
stated in § 13(d)(3), could be interpreted by the SEC as being included within the
meaning of "unincorporated organization." 112 Cong. Rec. 19,004 (1966).
The SEC had previously proposed to change its rules by including within the § 3(a)
(9). definition persons acting as a group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, disposing
or voting securities. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No., 6435, Dec. 12, 1960, [1957-1961 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 76,730. However,. this proposal was not adopted. Sec.
Ex. Act Rel. No. 6487, Mar. 9, 1961 [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
76,752.
100 Feldman and Teberg, supra note 105, at 1077.
110 17 C.F.R. § 241.1965 (1971).
111 H. R. Rep. supra note 84, at 2818; 113 Cong. Rec. 856 (1967). According to
Senator Williams, the purpose of § 13(d) (3) is to "successfully close the loopkole that now
exists which allows a syndicate, where no member owns more than 10 percent, to
escape the reporting requirements of the ... Act. Id.,
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II. "GROUPS" UNDER SECTION 13(d)
A. General Considerations
Paragraph (3) of subsection (d) provides that a partnership or
other group which acts to acquire, hold or dispose of securities shall
be considered a "person" for purposes of the subsection.'" The single
judicial precedent for determining the scope of paragraph (3) is
Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, where the court limited the definition to
stockholders acting to acquire an issuer's securities.'" The purpose of
this limitation was to avoid the undesirable implications suggested by
the district court decision in Bath which, arguably, held that whenever
stockholders owning over ten percent of an issuer's securities agree
to vote together in a corporate matter, they comprise a group required
to register.'"
The unlimited reach of the district court decision is well illustrated
by the situation of Clark Estates, Inc. (Clark), one of the Bath
defendants. Clark was the beneficial owner of Bath securities by virtue
of its ability to determine the voting of shares owned by a number of
accounts for which it provided investment advice. During the relevant
time period, Clark communicated with the defendant Merkle, a key
figure in the controversy, at the latter's request. Clark indicated to
Merkle dissatisfaction with the executive officer and a willingness to
support a move to replace him. On this basis, Clark was considered to
be a member of a group acting to hold Bath- securities and subject to
the disclosure requirements."5 , On review, the circuit court observed
that this decision would virtually destroy the right of stockholders to
discuss the performance of management and to cooperate in an effort
to replace officers when necessary. Weighing this consideration against
the need of investors to obtain pertinent information, the court con-
cluded that such action, standing alone, should be excluded from the
statute since, absent a decision to purchase additional shares to re-
inforce its position, a stockholders' agreement would not be of critical
importance to the investor."6
- The necessity of finding some limitation to the broad language
of paragraph (3) cannot be overemphasized. A liberal interpretation
of the language, such as that provided by the district court in Bath,
112 15 U.S.C.	 78m(d)(3) (1970),
114 Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 305 F. Supp. 526, 537-38 (ED. Wis. 1969). The SEC
interpretation of section 13(d)(3) appears to be as liberal as that in Bath. See e.g., SEC
v. Madison Square Garden Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep,
f 92,649 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) and The Budd Company, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 78,115 (1970) where, against arguments that there was no "pooling of
interests" or "concerted action," the SEC ruled that twelve lenders, who received warrants
to purchase an aggregate of 14% of an issuer's shares in connection with loans, were a
group required to file Schedule 13D. The only apparent linkage between the lenders was
the similarity of the forms of the agreements and the concurrent timing of each loan.
115 305 F. Supp. at 533-34, 539.
116 427 F.2d at 109-10.
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would adversely affect investors generally and the stockholders of a
particular corporation specifically. The basic premise of federal securi-
ties legislation is to compel disclosure of relevant information about an
issuer, its business and its management in a reasonably timely fashion
in order that investors may intelligently decide to buy or sell securi-
ties.'" Since disclosure is designed to affect market values and deci-
sions, however, care must be taken to establish disclosure requirements
which will not overwhelm the investor with information concerning
tentative agreements, or with facts of only marginal importance. Such
information would probably impair, rather than facilitate, the making
of investment decisions." 8
Furthermore, as the circuit court in Bath pointed out, an un-
restricted interpretation of paragraph (3) precludes any degree of
latitude in stockholder action vis-à-vis management before disclosure
is required.' 1° Such an interpretation is also certain to disturb stock-
holders who wish to cooperate in order to play a more effective role
in influencing corporate policy. An unwary stockholder may be sub-
ject to judicial sanctions, and to the expense of litigation, because
he, at one time, expressed his agreement with another stockholder on a
particular issue. A broad interpretation of paragraph (3) also increases
the possibility that management will successfully resort to litigation
as a delaying tactic whenever its position is threatened by a coalition
of stockholders.' 2° Finally, as the situation of Clark Estates, Inc.
illustrates,"" the necessity of requiring registration only upon the
occurrence of a specific and ascertainable event is absolutely vital to a
fair application of the statute. Unless stockholders or their advisers
know when registration is required, the effects of the Amendment are
more likely to be deleterious than ameliorative.
Notwithstanding the merit of the circuit court's analysis of the
problem in Bath, its solution was incorrect. As noted above, the con-
117 See the statement of former SEC Chairman Cohen, note 55 supra.
118
 Hearings on S. 510, supra note 55, at 130 (statement of Arthur Fleisher, Jr.); see
also, Fleisher, Corporate Disclosure/Insider Trading, 45 Harv. Bus. Rev. 129, 133 (Jan.-
Feb. 1967).
Referring to the information to be disclosed under § 13(d)(1)(E), 15 U.S.C.
	 78
m(d)(1)(E) (1970), which requires disclosure of contracts, arrangements or understand-
ings with respect to securities of an issuer including transfer or joint ventures, one court
indicated that only "concrete understandings" need be disclosed. Electronics Specialty
Co. v. International Controls Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1063, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). From this
premise, the court concluded that there was no need to disclose unsolicited promises by
brokers to tender large blocks of an issuer's securities if a tender offer were made.
110 427 F.2d at 109-10.
120 Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, IS N.Y.L.F. 269,
297 n.104 (1969). See generally SchmuIts and Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids—Defensive
Tactics, 23 Bus. Law. 115 (1967).
In Electronics Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969), Judge Friendly, speaking for the court, cautioned district judges to "be vigilant
against resort to the courts on trumped-up or trivial grounds as a means of delaying and
thereby defeating legitimate tender offers." Id. at 947.
121 See text accompanying note 115 supra.
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elusion that Congress intended the subsection to apply 'only when
securities are purchased is inconsistent with the statutory language.'22
Fortunately, the concept of beneficial interest, which rejects the court's
solution, suggests another. Having previously concluded that the tradi-
tional principles of beneficial ownership should be used to define
acquisition,' it follows that the same precept must be used to deter-
mine when a group should be considered a beneficial owner of securi-
ties held by its constituents.'" Since the subsection was designed to
reveal shifts in ownership which affect corporate control, the pertinent
benefits of ownership are those having control implications: those
which confer (a) the ability to exercise controlling influence over the
purchase or sale and (b) the ability to determine the voting of securi-
ties. These generally correspond to the "acquiring, holding or dispos-
ing" language of paragraph (3). Thus; a number of defendants should
be considered a "group" only if a factual inquiry into their situation
indicates that they enjoy incidents of ownership which will enable
them to benefit from those activities that the Williams Amendments
were designed to disclose.
B. Acting to "Acquire, Hold and Dispose" of Securities
The decision of the district court in Bath provides an appropriate
example for the application of the foregoing suggestions. Apparently,
the court determined that every group of stockholders, the members
of which agree to vote their securities in concert, comes within the
scope of the Amendment. While the court did not express its rationale,
it seems to have equated persons "pooling their interests" with persons
acting as a group for the purpose of acquiring, holding or disposing of
securities. Determining that by the agreement to vote in concert the
defendants bad pooled their interests, the court then concluded that
they came within the meaning of a group "acting to hold securities"
and were required to register. However, a close examination of this
reasoning reveals that the court has not resolved the definitional prob-
lems of the paragraph (3) language but has merely substituted the
nebulous term "pool" for the broad but descriptive terms "acquire,
hold and dispose." Even if this substitution were acceptable, the court's
reasoning that stockholder concurrence in voting constitutes a pooling
arrangement exceeds traditional limits.
Various forms of pooling arrangements—such as the voting trust,
the voting pool and the irrevocable proxy—have long been recognized
as legitimate means through which individuals in a minority can obtain
122 See pp. 166-68 supra.
123
 See p. 168 supra.
124 The argument is that § 13(d) (3), 15 U.S.C. 78 m(d)(3) (1970), evidences a
legislative determination that the principles of beneficial ownership developed under
§ 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(a) (1970), are extended to include joint ventures for purposes
of § 13(d) disclosure requirements. This is not a novel idea. It was suggested in Feldman
and Teberg, supra note 105, at 1076-77 and was previously proposed by the SEC; see
note 108 supra.
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corporate control. As a rule, these agreements must be in writing and,
in many states, must be filed with the corporation. Undoubtedly, all
persons so acting come within the ambit of the Amendment as consti-
tuting a group acting to hold the securities of an issuer. However, for
obvious reasons, the concept of pooling as a means of obtaining corpo-
rate control has never embraced the mere concurrence of several
stockholders to vote in concert on a particular issue at a particular
time."° Of course, a group of stockholders might well control the
course of corporate behavior by their concurrence in voting, even over
a number of years. But it is not the concurrence in itself which is
important, for this is a possibility which is inherent in the right to
vote. Rather, it is that the vote is a result of the independent exercise
of judgment by each stockholder. If this be the case, then there has
been no firm commitment until the vote is cast. The information which
the investor can realistically expect to obtain, and which is sufficiently
firm to serve as a basis for investment decisions, is the vote itself and
not the tentative judgment of the stockholders. Furthermore, the broad
characterization of the defendants' action as a "pool" contradicts
even the Bath court's definition of "beneficial interest." According
to the court, a beneficial interest is the ability to determine how secur-
ities are voted.'" The defendants, either as a group or as individuals,
did not have that ability in Bath. It is therefore submitted that section
13 (d) (3) applies to voting pools only where the individual members
have made a firm commitment and the group has the ability to deter-
mine how the securities are to be voted.
Groups acting to dispose of securities are equally important to
the broad objectives of the statute. While their activities may seem
inconsistent with the acquisition requirement of the statute, such a
group will have acquired a beneficial interest in the holdings of its
constituents by virtue of their concerted effort to sell.'" This ostensibly
anomalous result is consistent with the aim of the Amendments. Sales
of target company securities prior to a cash tender offer may be
executed for the purpose of depressing the market price so that the
tender offer can be made at a more advantageous price." 28 In addition,
there may be violations of the antifraud provisions and the more
specific antimanipulative section of the Exchange Ace" It has been
125 See generally 5 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. {§ 2049.1 et seq., {11 2064 et seq., {1 2075
et seq. (perm. ed. rev. 1967) Similarily, the SEC would appear to distinguish between
groups acting to hold securities and those acting to vote securities. See Sec. Ex. Act Rel.
No. 6435 [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. V 76,730 (1960) where the
SEC proposed to redefine person in 3(a) (9) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)
(9) (1970), to include persons acting to acquire, hold, dispose or vote the securities of an
issuer.
126 305 F. Supp. at 537-38, 427 F.2d at 112.
127 See p. 168 supra.
125 Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 459, 518 (1969).
12e Id. See also Sisak v. Wings and Wheels Express, Inc. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 92,991 at 90,671 (1970); SEC v. Posner, [1970-1971 Transfer
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suggested that tender offers have been proposed with as much a view to
the trading profit if the offer is unsuccessful, as to the possibility of a
takeover."° Also, the sale of a controlling interest raises the spectre of
liability under section 10-b. 13 ' Disclosure under section 13 (d) may
well tend to discourage such activities and provide information relevant
to a suit to recover damages for abuses under the sections mentioned.
Because speculation in a corporation's equity securities may cause
a loss of public confidence in the corporation, and thereby indirectly
harm the corporation's financial outlook or reflect adversely upon the
management, registration of these activities directly serves the objec-
tives of the Williams Amendments. Thus, groups acting to dispose of
securities should be required to make disclosure under section 13(d).
Whether stockholders have acted as a group to dispose of securi-
ties is a question of fact."' Proof of the group purpose will consist,
at least in part, of evidence of unusual market activity or evidence
that the defendants received a premium price for their aggregated
securities. While no court has considered this problem, the opportunity
was presented in Sisak v. Wings and Wheels Express, Inc., where two
stockholders, who collectively owned more than ten percent of Wings
stock, agreed to sell their holdings at a substantial premium."' Al-
though the court found no group action in the case, its conclusion was
directed principally at the plaintiff's argument that both the buyers
and the sellers constituted a group."'
Groups acting to purchase are of the same genre as those acting
to dispose of securities. In both situations, the coalition of substantial
beneficial ownership enables the individuals to profit from trading
abuses.'" For this reason, and the obvious intent of Congress to in-
clude groups acting to 'purchase securities within the ambit of the
Amendments, these groups should be required to register. However,
it seems unwise to characterize, as did the Bath court, a group effort
as "acquiring securities" within the paragraph (3) definition solely
because its members agreed to vote together, and because some of them,
made purchases.'" Where small purchases are involved, the hazards
of speculation are minimal. Similarly, the fact that a stockholder is
connected with others who are obviously acquiring securities for specu-
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,049, 71 Civ. 2256 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), summary of
complaint alleging a violation of 10b-5 for failing to report a purchase of securities
resulting in more than a 10% beneficial ownership.
130 Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269,
300-01 (1969).
131 Schwartz, The Sale of Control and the 1934 Act: New Directions for Federal
Corporation Law, 15 N.Y.L.F. 674 (1969).
132 Whether a person is a beneficial ownerfor the purposes of a particular subsection
is also essentially a factual question. 11 Fed. Reg. 10970 (1938). 17 C.F.R. 0 241.1965
(1971).
133 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. if 92,991 at 90,668 (1970).
ia4 Id. at 90,669-70.
185 Feldman and Teberg, supra note 105, at 1058-59.
130 427 F.2d at 110.
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lation purposes does not justify including him within the group unless
other evidence indicates that the profits of speculation accrue to him,
directly or indirectly. As an evidentiary standard, a two percent
acquisition by various members of the group would seem to comport
with the aims of Congress. This suggestion is derived from sections
13 (d) (6) (B) and (D) which indicate a congressional effort to exclude
acquisitions made for investment purposes from the reporting require-
ments. To this end, the point of discrimination was set at two
percent.'"
It should be noted that less severe standards are suggested for
groups acting to hold securities than those acting to acquire or dispose;
that is, a more formal agreement must exist before a group voting
securities is required to register. The reason for the difference is that
voting, as a beneficial incident, is intrinsic to security ownership."'
The voting of securities is not only a legitimate activity, it is to be en-
couraged. Similarly, cooperative voting efforts inevitably result from
an interested body of stockholders and they provide a desirable pro-
phylaxis to incompetent or unprogressive management. On the other
hand, the ability to purchase and sell securities is a speculative inci-
dent of ownership."' Speculation lends itself to abuse and the danger
is magnified where large stockholders act concurrently."' Since persons
engaging in speculative abuses are bound by an untainted desire for
profit, and since the abuse can occur within a relatively short period
of time, mere concurrence of action is usually sufficient to enable the
participants to reap the benefits of consolidated ownership.
By way of summary, it was suggested that joint stockholder action
is not a reportable event unless it is determined that the "group" has
acquired a beneficial interest in the securities held by its members.
Whether the group has become the beneficial owner of the securities
should be determined in accordance with the principles of beneficial
ownership which have developed under Section 16 of the Exchange
Act. A group acts (a) to hold securities where its constituents have
made a firm commitment and the group has the ability to determine
how the securities are voted; or (b) to purchase or dispose of securities
where it is demonstrated that the members of the group have received
the benefits of stock speculation. Different standards were suggested
for the two categories of beneficial ownership in order to achieve an
137
 Section 13(d) (6) (B), IS U.S.C. 78m(d) (6) (B) (1970), excludes from the filing
requirement all acquisitions which, together with all other acquisitions by the same person,
do not exceed 2 percent of the class. Presumably, this is not net of any sales during the
twelve month period. 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3664 (Supp. 1969). Section 13(d) (6)
(D), 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)(6)(D) (1970), excludes acquisitions which in the determina-
tion of the SEC are not entered into for the purpose of, nor have the effect of, influencing
the control of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the purposes of the
subsection. ,
138
 Feldman and Teberg, supra note 105, at 1059.
139 Id.
149
 Id. at 1059-60.
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optimum balance between the need of investors for disclosure and the
desirability of encouraging certain stockholder behavior.
CONCLUSION
One of the primary objectives of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets."'
To a great extent, Congress has relied upon a philosophy of full dis-
closure to achieve this objective. Clearly, the disclosure requirements
of the Act will be ineffective unless they reach everyone engaging in
the practices which the statute was designed to prevent or reveal. To
avoid circumvention, the statute is phrased in broad language and
requires both legal and beneficial owners to comply with the registra-
tion requirements. 142
Section 13 (d) was enacted for the purpose of making public any
changes in corporate ownership. On its face, the provision requires the
disclosure of acquisitions of "beneficial ownership of any equity secu-
rity • . ."—language theoretically designed to encompass all relevant
changes in ownership. However, recent judicial interpretations have
tended to limit the application of this subsection to situations in which
a person has purchased securities. It was suggested that these decisions
substantially reduce the effectiveness of section 13 (d) as a source of
investor information. Furthermore, it was submitted that the decisions
are not supported by the provision's legislative history and that they
are in conflict with the fundamental and salutary disclosure philosophy
of the Exchange Act.
Nonetheless, some restriction must be imposed on the broad
language of paragraph (3) which, arguably, has been interpreted to
mean that all cooperative stockholder efforts come within the scope
of the subsection. The solution to this problem, it is concluded, lies in
the application of the principles of beneficial ownership to group
efforts, and not in the arbitrary conclusion that a purchase of securities
is a prerequisite to disclosure.
BRADFORD J. POWELL
141 15 U.S.C. I 78b (1970).
142 During the hearings on the Exchange Act, Senator Carey asked, "Is 'beneficial
owner' the proper term there?" Mr. Corcoran, one of the drafters of the Act answered,
"It is the broadest term you can have." Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 6556 (1934). See Feldman and Teberg, supra note
105, at 1058 n.22.
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